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on the dependent variable. Where ethnic prejudices or longings of 
vengeance exist, they are typically more common than atrocities2. 
Hence there must be speciﬁ  c conditions under which prejudiced 
persons commit atrocities. As we will see in the Srebrenica case, 
situational factors can prevent motivated people from acting on 
their prejudices or it can pull people into murderous activity that 
they may not have been planning.
With regard to Serbian violence against Bosnian Muslims, stud-
ies have often cited the Balkan’s history of ethnic rivalry. Volkan 
(2004) argues for example that Serbian violence can be explained 
by the lasting emotional impact of the Serbian defeat at the Battle 
of Kosovo in 1389 and efforts by political elites to mobilize these 
latent memories in collective frames of ethnic superiority. Both, 
he claims prepared the atrocities. However, the situational dynam-
ics of the Srebrenica massacre show that it emerged from local 
short-run shifts in emotions. There is no automatic, “situation-
free” causality running from pre-existing motivational factors to 
atrocities insofar as all background conditions still need to pass 
through a situational turning point. (2) Standard explanations 
are unable to account for what massacres actually look like on the 
micro-level. Scholars typically treat massacres as aggregate units 
and thus neglect that atrocities typically unfold over several hours 
or days in a chain of events; we need to take these extended periods 
and its sequences of violence (killings, rape, mutilations) seriously. 
I suggest paying attention to the internal dynamics of massacres 
themselves, i.e. what form massacres take on the micro-level. In 
Srebrenica there were several different episodes of killing, some 
triumphant, bullying and spontaneous, some more methodical, 
and a halt after a few days even though more Bosnian Muslim 
men were being captured and without formal orders to stop the 
killings. Arguments based on motives, dehumanizing collective 
frames, or ethnic hostility, are insufﬁ  cient to account for what 
happened locally.
INTRODUCTION – ATROCITIES AND THE MICRO-SOCIOLOGY 
OF VIOLENCE
Recent advances in the micro-sociology of violence (Katz, 1988; 
Grossman, 1996, 2004; Klinger, 2004; Collins, 2008) show that 
situational, emotional dynamics of micro-interactions largely 
“determine what kinds of violence will or will not happen, and 
when and how” (Collins, 2008: 20). What gets done in terms of vio-
lence is patterned by local, emotional dynamics. Following these 
ﬁ  ndings, this paper presents a critique of prevalent approaches 
in the study of war and civil war atrocities1. The latter have been 
focusing on background factors, far away from the immediate 
micro-situations in which atrocities actually occur: e.g. ethnic 
conﬂ  ict, collective frames that de-legitimize an opponent, or 
vengeance of perceived humiliations. In contrast, this paper shows 
that micro-situational dynamics are crucial to explain where and 
when atrocities do or do not come off and what they look like on 
the micro-level. It does so by means of a close look at a particular 
case, the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina in 
which more than 7000 Bosnian Muslim men were killed after the 
Bosnian Serb Army had overrun the UN enclave of Srebrenica. 
The atrocity is of particular interest since the rich micro-data 
available (incl. video-material) gets us close into the dynamics 
of the situation.
MICRO-SITUATIONAL DYNAMICS AND ATROCITIES
The micro-sociology of violence suggests that for an explanation of 
atrocities we need to put “the interaction in the centre of analysis, 
not […] (the) background […] or even the motivation” (Collins, 
2008: 1). Standard explanations of atrocities that emphasize back-
ground-variables and motives such as ethnic hatred, vengeance, or 
collective frames of racial/ethnic superiority, fall short of a sufﬁ  cient 
argument in two respects: (1) They are insufﬁ  cient to explain where 
and when atrocities do or do not come off; these approaches sample 
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ATROCITIES AND CONFRONTATIONAL TENSION/FEAR
Standard explanations of atrocities suffer from the intrinsic assump-
tion that the last step, from anger, cultural prejudices, or ethnic 
hostility to violence is easy and automatic. However, advances in 
the micro-sociology of violence show that violence is not easy but 
difﬁ  cult, especially in close-range face-to-face confrontations, and 
that most people shirk the performance of it even if the motivation 
exists and antagonists are very angry or vengeful. Most conﬂ  icts 
and the most typical expression of anger consist of dramatic bluster 
and bluff, threatening a distant enemy but not actually doing much 
to violently attack someone.
The key to understand violence, according to Collins, is the 
concept of confrontational tension/fear. He argues that violent situ-
ations are emotional confrontations, i.e. they are characterized by 
tension and fear. Military studies, research on police violence, and 
other micro-sociological studies of violence show that people feel 
a pervasive tension and fear in violent situations (cf. e.g. Marshall, 
2000; Klinger, 2004 [1947]; Collins, 2008); micro-evidence such 
as pictures shows that peoples’ facial expressions and postures are 
strained, tense, and fearful (Collins, 2008). The source of confron-
tational tension is not moral aversion against violent behaviour 
or fear of injury. It is an interactional   tension/fear; it is difﬁ  cult to 
actually hurt someone in face-to-face interaction. Thus, violent 
situations and what we observe in terms of violence is “shaped by 
an emotional ﬁ  eld of tension and fear” (Collins, 2008: 19).
According to the micro-sociology of violence, successful, domi-
nating violence that we observe in atrocities must overcome the 
interactional confrontational tension/fear, i.e. it requires special 
emotional conditions. According to Collins, it depends on estab-
lishing emotional dominance. Without emotional dominance, 
conﬂ  icts are usually standoffs, both sides making gestures at each 
other without much damage actually getting done. Successful 
violence is then a matter of one side breaking down, losing its 
emotional energy (EE; Collins, 2004), i.e. its conﬁ  dence, inter-
nal cohesion, and lapsing into passivity, which in turn makes the 
other side emotionally stronger and determined. Atrocious vio-
lence comes off, then, in a reciprocal interaction: one side becomes 
emotionally weaker, the other emotionally stronger and violent; 
and this happens in a sequence of micro-interactions that feed 
back into each other.
War atrocities such as killing prisoners or unarmed civilians 
and committing mass rapes typically emerge out of violent con-
frontations which result in extreme shifts towards emotional 
dominance; they go from a period of tense standoff to a sudden 
overwhelming dominance of one side over passive and demoral-
ized victims. Violence in atrocities is carried out by attacking a 
weak enemy, who can no longer resist; and victimhood is micro-
situationally constructed by being emotionally dominated, which 
in turn pulls in determination and violence on the other side. 
I want to underline the key point: pre-existing background forces 
per se are not enough to bring about atrocities. There must be 
an additional step: emotional dominance in the immediate local 
situation. As I will show, micro-interactions are crucial here; they 
constitute turning points, to or away from atrocities. What is 
more, the internal dynamics of an atrocity, i.e. what we observe 
in terms of violence, is structured by micro-situational dynamics 
and confrontational tension.
Excursus: the concept of aggression and theories of atrocities
A cornerstone of standard explanations of atrocities is their focus on 
the concept of aggression. The concept of confrontational  tension/
fear challenges this constituent.
References to the concept of aggression typically take two forms 
in theories of atrocities:
a.  The frustration–aggression hypothesis: the pathway into atro-
city is conceptualized here as one that leads from experien-
ces of frustration, humiliation, or defeat, to anger, which in 
turn prompts aggression (most commonly in the sense of a 
widespread usage of derogatory ethnic frames and epithets as 
well as actual violent action, cf. e.g. Horne and Kramer, 2001; 
Volkan, 2004).
b.  Stressing the effect of social learning and/or violent (militari-
stic) cultural traditions on atrocities (cf. e.g. Chang, 1997).
For our purposes three aspects are important to note:
I.  From a micro-interactional perspective the term aggression 
has several meanings: 
(1) Being very energetic, proactive, rather than passive; here 
the word is often used in a metaphorical way: aggressive 
style of soccer; an aggressive advertising campaign; 
(2) Being confrontational (engaging in human communica-
tive action at cross-purposes) or seeking out a conversa-
tional confrontation; 
(3) Making a violent threat (i.e. bluster);
(4) Carrying out violent action and causing bodily harm
Numbers (3) and (4) are the most relevant with regard 
to atrocities; the major weakness of standard explanations 
of atrocities is that they tend not to distinguish between (3) 
and (4) and do not see the difﬁ  culty of moving from (3) to 
(4). Verbal aggression and threats, i.e. derogatory ethnic fra-
mes and talk of ethnic cleansing, are treated as if they were 
the same as carrying out violent action. However, hostile 
language and verbal threats mostly involve bluster and bluff 
and do not automatically carry over into violent behaviour 
(Collins, 2008: 23). The micro-sociological approach shows 
that violence is difﬁ  cult in face-to-face interaction and that 
we need to look at the dynamics of micro-situations for an 
adequate understanding of violence.
II.  Cultural explanations of atrocities referring to violent, aggres-
sive, or militarist traditions of a group do “not get closely into 
the process by which violence takes place” (Collins, 2008: 22). 
This kind of interpretation of atrocities assumes violence to 
be easy. There seems to be some evidence for effects of social 
learning; however, a micro-sociological perspective would 
emphasize the micro-situational aspect of it: that is, learning 
techniques of establishing situational dominance and thus 
getting around confrontational tension. Furthermore, expla-
nations of atrocities referring to social learning assume the 
latter to be the necessary and often implicitly the sufﬁ  cient 
explanation of atrocities; however, atrocities “have patterns of 
situational emergence in which local emotional dynamics […] 
are overwhelmingly apparent” (Collins, 2008: 21). The dyna-
mics of micro-situations are still crucial (Collins, 2008: 23).Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  November 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 42  |  3
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III. The concept of aggression tends to cut out the empirical 
and theoretical problem of internal dynamics of atrocities 
(i.e. its time-patterns and forms of violence); the broadness 
of the concept aggression blurs different forms and time-
patterns of violent action that occur during a massacre. 
The micro-sociological approach to violence pays close 
attention to the chain of interactions (including different 
forms of violence) during a massacre and explicitly raises 
the question of what explains time-structures and violence-
patterns of atrocities; as I will show below, they are pat-
terned by micro-situational dynamics and confrontational 
tension/fear.
A MICRO-MACRO CONTINUUM OF ATROCITIES
Not all war atrocities are of the same kind. A theoretically useful 
way to classify them is along a micro–macro continuum. At the 
very macro-end we ﬁ  nd atrocities that are bureaucratic, imper-
sonal, and callous (the Holocaust would be the extreme example). 
Here, macro-background conditions are the key explanatory vari-
able. At the micro-end of the continuum emotional dynamics are 
crucial. The micro-sociological theory spelled out in this paper 
focuses on the micro-end, i.e. locally caused atrocities. The argu-
ments are developed by tracing the Srebrenica massacre through 
a series of phases (cf. Figure 1), based on video and other micro-
level data.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
DATA
I used data from the following sources:
a.  Scholarly research on the Srebrenica massacre and the Bosnian 
civil war more generally (e.g. Honig and Both, 1997; Rohde, 
1997). Of primary importance is the 2002 report by the 
Netherlands Institute for the Documentation of War Crimes 
(NIOD) of several thousand pages.
b.  Indictments, statements of facts, and transcripts of the major 
Srebrenica trial proceedings at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
c.  Interviews that I conducted at the ICTY and with a former 
Bosnian Muslim interpreter for the UN in Srebrenica3.
d.  More than 8 h of video-footage of a Serbian TV camera-team 
that accompanied the BSA troops. The ICTY gave me access to 
this video-material, which had been used during trials.
DATA-ANALYSIS
The key relevance of the micro-data was to provide insights into 
the situational, emotional dynamics preceding and shaping the 
massacre. In my analysis I have focused on dynamics of emotional 
dominance and its counterpart, emotional subordination. The key 
quality is what Collins (2004) calls emotional energy (EE), which 
varies between a high of conﬁ  dence, enthusiasm, and emotional 
initiative, and a low of negative self-feelings, depression, and passiv-
ity. Emotional initiative/domination and its counterpart, emotional 
passivity/subordination, are produced by micro-interactions: (a) by 
the amount of successful solidarity rituals among group members 
on each side (Durkheim, 1995 [1912]), which create feelings of con-
ﬁ  dence and ebullience; and (b) by the micro-interactions between 
contending sides producing feelings of dominance or subordination 
(Kemper, 1978; Collins, 2004). In a conﬂ  ict, the side which becomes 
dominant goes through micro-sequences of mutual attunement and 
emotional solidarity which gives them feelings of group strength; in 
addition, in its interactions with opponents, it sets the rhythm and 
tone of the interaction and cuts off the other side’s rival attempts. In 
the analysis of my data-sources I have focused on each side’s EE in 
interactions with other parties and their rituals of group solidarity. 
To gain an extensive picture of the atrocity’s emotional dynamics, 
I have supplemented the analysis of EE and group solidarity with 
what is often considered as the primary human emotions (cf. Ekman, 
2003): joy/happiness, anger, fear, sadness, and surprise.
Of particular importance for my analysis was the video- material; 
it allowed a close look at emotions as they unfolded over time 
(for the methods of video-analysis cf. Section “Video-Analysis”). 
3The documents under (a–b) provide in-depth descriptions of the events before, 
during, and after the massacre; for the attack and the atrocity itself they give detai-
led descriptions for each day.
(1) 1993 until summer 1995 : Standoff around Srebrenica between opposing forces of the
Bosnian-Serb-Army (BSA) and the Bosnian-Muslim Army of Bosnia-and-Herzegovina
(ABiH); neither side is capable of committing large-scale violence against the other.
(2) January to June 1995, reaching a peak at 9-11 July: The UN peacekeeping force
becomes demoralized by their own lack of organizational competence, and emotionally
dominated by both, the Bosnian Muslims and the Serbs.
(3) 9-11 July : Collapse of the peacekeepers leads to emotional collapse of the ABiH forces.  
(4) 9 July : Recognizing the sudden enemy weakness, the BSA becomes emboldened, and
expands their military aims to take over the whole enclave.
(5) Evening of 11 July : The turning point to the massacre, as the UN commander and
Bosnian Muslim representative show themselves paralyzed under the BSA commander’s
domineering manner.
(6) Afternoon 12 July to morning 13 July : The emotionally triumphant, bullying, humiliating
phase of the massacre.
(7) 13 July – 16 July : Routinization of the massacre into impersonal killing methods and by
19 July gradual decline in killing.
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Furthermore, the interviews that I conducted as well as the extensive 
literature on the Srebrenica massacre contain rich information on 
the emotions on each side involved in the conﬂ  ict, i.e. the BSA, 
ABiH, and the UN peacekeeping forces. Based on these two sources 
of data I was able to create a sequential time-line, tracing the emo-
tions on all three sides over time.
Video-analysis
The analysis of emotions in the video-material was based on 
methods developed by Ekman (Ekman et al., 1972; Ekman and 
Rosenberg, 1997; Ekman, 2001, 2003; Ekman and Friesen, 2003), 
Scherer (Scherer, 1982; Scherer and Ekman, 1984), Scheff (Scheff 
and Retzinger, 1991), and Collins (2004). My work applied their 
research tools on how detect emotions in micro-data. They have 
shown that information about emotions is identiﬁ  able in the 
human voice, body movements, and facial expressions; their work 
reveals that there are various body and facial parts that are not eas-
ily manipulated or consciously controlled; they leak information 
about felt emotions.
In the ﬁ  rst step of the video-analysis I (a) transcribed the verbal 
communications including emphases, pauses, voice pitch, and other 
paralinguistic markers (cf. Section “Transcribing Conventions” in 
Appendix for transcribing conventions)4 and (b) described all non-
verbal behaviour in close detail. To do so I conducted a moment-by-
moment sequential analysis of the video-tapes; multiple viewings 
including in slow-motion allowed me to track nonverbal behav-
iour in different parts of the body and provide for a high level of 
accuracy and conﬁ  dence in the descriptions. In the second step of 
the analysis I made inferences about emotions from the observed 
verbal and nonverbal cues; to do so I constructed a list of indicators 
for group solidarity, EE, and primary emotions from the works by 
Ekman and others (cf. Section “Emotional Cues” in Appendix). This 
procedure permitted the detection of emotions as they occurred in 
moment-by-moment sequences. In the presentation of my results 
below, there is room to include only a few segments of the video-
material. I picked those that were crucial in establishing situational 
emotional dominance.
RESULTS
MICRO-SITUATIONAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE SREBRENICA-MASSACRE
Standoff phase and the Serbian attack on Srebrenica (Phase 1)
In retrospect the 2-year period between 1993 (when Srebrenica 
was declared a UN safe area) and 1995, which was characterized by 
waves of raids, sniping, and smaller skirmishes around Srebrenica 
from both sides (Bosnian Muslims and Serbs) might look as if it 
anticipated the massacre. However, when the Bosnian Serbs began 
their military operations against the enclave at the beginning of July 
1995, there were neither plans to take over the whole enclave, nor 
expectations of easy military victory, and nor plans to exterminate 
all Muslim men. Short-run emotions determined what happened.
When the BSA had started their attack on July 6, the UN forces 
were the ﬁ  rst to break down emotionally, setting off chain reactions 
among the other parties.
Increasing Serbian emotional dominance over 
the UN forces (Phase 2)
The level of EE among the Dutch peacekeepers was low already 
before the Serbian attack. They were frustrated from typical 
strains of peacekeeping missions (cf. NIOD, 2002; Sion, 2006): (1) 
Tensions with the local population they were supposed to protect; 
(2) Interference by contending parties with supply convoys; and (3) 
Relatively light weaponry (to keep up a neutral image), which made 
the peacekeeping forces feel weak. In theory, the UN force was sup-
posed to be superior because of its ability to call in air strikes. In prac-
tice, however, those air strikes that were deployed were so limited and 
ill-timed that they served chieﬂ  y to anger the BSA without harming 
their local military power. Bureaucratic strains undermined more 
forceful air support. The UN mission suffered from an extremely 
complex and bureaucratic form of command, which created severe 
malfunctions in the ﬂ  ow of information between Srebrenica and 
higher UN authorities. The bureaucratic procedure was an effort 
to keep up an image of neutrality by following rules in a highly for-
malistic manner. In contrast, effective war-time armies try to avoid 
bureaucratic procedures in combat (Marshall, 2000 [1947]).
Shortly after the start of the Serbian attack, the peacekeep-
ing forces retreated from several of their observation posts (OP). 
In response to the withdrawal, Bosnian Muslims threatened or 
attacked peacekeepers; in one incident a Dutch soldier was killed. 
These assaults increased the suspense among the Dutch. They 
became disoriented and paralyzed by being attacked from both 
sides. Almost all actual violence in fact is two-sided; any other struc-
ture seems difﬁ  cult, because too disorienting for ﬁ  ghters to sustain5. 
Ultimately, the Dutch reached a level of fear at which they could 
no longer play an active role in the conﬂ  ict. Peacekeepers panicked 
in several incidents and blocking positions, set up to deter Serbian 
advances into the town-center of Srebrenica, were given up quickly 
when shells exploded in the vicinity. The Dutch were emotionally 
overwhelmed and became focused on their own weakness.
The situational construction of a weak victim – the Bosnian 
Muslims (Phase 3)
The Muslim troops had been holding their own military positions 
for many months and engaged themselves in numerous raids into 
Bosnian-Serb territory. However, the panic among the Dutch and 
the surrender of OPs set off a negative spiral among the ABiH 
forces. After initial outbursts of righteous anger against the Dutch, 
depression and fear set in and quickly impaired all action. Over the 
whole course of the Serbian attack, the Bosnian Muslims put up 
little resistance and the defensive lines disintegrated rapidly; a large 
part of their ammunition remained unused (NIOD, 2002: Part III, 
Ch. 5/6; Rohde, 1997: 43).
Growth of Serbian emotional dominance (Phase 4)
The paralyzation among the UN and ABiH forces emboldened the 
BSA and pulled in their determination and initiative. When the 
Serbs began their military operations against Srebrenica, they had 
4The video-recordings provide transcriptions in subtitles, including ofﬁ  cial tran-
slations from Serbian into English. I have reﬁ  ned the transcriptions of everything 
that was said in English.
5The multi-sidedness of pillow ﬁ  ghts and other playful violence is the exception; 
these have the form of self-entertainment. Crucially, if they turn serious they tend 
“to fall into a two-sided pattern”, most typically a “ganging up on the weakest vic-
tim, the one most prone to break down.” (Collins, 2008: 13)Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  November 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 42  |  5
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not intended to take over the whole enclave but only to reduce its 
size. The military aims were extended only at the end of the third 
day of the operation (July 9), when their attack did not meet seri-
ous resistance (NIOD, 2002: Part III, Ch. 7). In fact, the Serbs ran 
their military operations cautiously. They tried to prevent close-
proximity ﬁ  ghts with the ABiH, advanced only gradually, and at 
night often retreated into hideouts. Also, the Serbs used their artil-
lery against the Dutch and ABiH mainly to intimidate them (the 
low number of casualties is striking here). Similarly, BSA soldiers 
blustered and engaged in dramatized postures of conﬁ  dence (e.g. 
the three-ﬁ  ngered Serbian salute) when they tried to force the 
surrender of UN OPs (Rohde, 1997: 30). These are group rituals, 
creating an appearance of “being tough” and “mean” (Katz, 1988: 
81). Grossman stresses the key role of posturing in combat; he 
notes that whoever “puffs himself up the biggest […] is likely to 
win” and that “battle is a process of posturing until one side or 
another turns and runs.” (Grossman, 2004: 198) The victory of 
the Serbs was achieved through emotional battering rather than 
physical destruction.
When the BSA’s posturing triggered fear and passivity among 
the UN and Bosnian Muslim forces, this in turn led to a steady rise 
in the Serbs’ determination, excitement, and their use of violence. 
In video-recordings a BSA ofﬁ  cer charges his troops: “They are 
in panic. […] Move so as to force them out. […] C’mon push it 
now; they are in trouble. NATO pact can’t do anything to us.” This 
further strengthened when the BSA entered Srebrenica town on 
July 11 and found its centre abandoned. On video-recordings we 
see ofﬁ  cers in a joyous mood; smiling faces and hugs indicate their 
delight. Soon, however, General Ratko Mladic ´, commander of the 
BSA troops, forcefully urges his troops to move on: “Let’s go boys, 
move! […] Take advantage of the panic among the Turks!” These 
local emotional dynamics ﬁ  t the pathway into atrocity outlined at 
the beginning: one side acquires emotional dominance while the 
other side looses its organizational cohesion and becomes emotion-
ally paralyzed and passive; a pattern of attacking a weak victim is 
situationally constructed, providing a pathway around confronta-
tional tension/fear and the impetus towards atrocity.
The micro-situational turning point into the massacre (Phase 5)
After the Serbs’ occupation of Srebrenica town, General Mladic ´ and 
the commander of the Dutch peacekeeping forces in Srebrenica, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans met. The emotional content of the 
interaction has a clear structure: Mladic ´ forces micro-domination 
on Karremans. This constituted an important momentum towards 
the massacre; it dramatized the emotional dynamic that had crystal-
lized before: the situational construction of a weak victim.
Right at the beginning of the meeting Mladic ´ challenges 
Karremans; it is an attempt to establish situational dominance:
Mladic ´ (M): So you ordered to shoot my soldiers and that NATO airforce you 
requested that NATO airforce strike at my troops?
Mladic ´’s (M) head and gaze are turned downwards. He then directs his gaze 
towards Karremans (K). M stands with his hands on his hips and elbows turned 
outward. K stands stiff, with arms folded before his abdomen. He looks at M 
and scratches and strokes his right arm with the thumb of his left hand.
Translator (T):…* K looks at the Translator (T) and continues to heavily scratch and stroke his 
right arm. Before T has completed the translation, K looks down.
Karremans (K): No not again that’s not decided by me ehhh (<1 s) nor asked 
for. The time say when they are over they make decisions on what I wou on 
information eh from ehe the bottom eh toeh Sarajevo to eh the United Nations 
in New York.
K shakes his head as a ‘No’; short gaze aversion; K then shifts gaze to T; then 
gaze aversion; K’s head and upper body then slightly bowed; he looks slightly 
from below to M and moves right arm up to his left; K next raises his left hand 
and then looks at the ceiling with his head turned backwards; next K looks at 
T, then at M with his chin slightly down, then wheels his head slightly.
T: Once again, that decision was not made by me but rather on the basis of 
the information that I gave you. The decision was made at a higher instance.
While T translates, M stares at K. K wheels his head slightly in a horizontal 
direction, looking into T’s direction.
M: Do not fantasise Lieutenant-Colonel, Sir, but answer my question: did 
you order your troops to shoot at my troops?
K shortly folds his arms in front of his chest, then holds his throat and cheek 
with his left hand and strikes his skin; K and M look at each other.
T:… K still holds and rubs his cheek/throat. Then re-folds his arms in front of his 
abdomen.
K: I gave the order to defend themselves (slightly breaking voice). K: at ﬁ  rst gaze down. At the end he looks at M; slight sway of his body.
T:…
K: That’s … (unintelligible)  K looks down; M cuts in with ﬁ  rm and loud voice:
M: Who were they defending themselves from, when no one was 
attacking them?
M and K look at each other.
T:…
K: I’ve been attacked by mortars and by tanks. K looks at M; sway with torso.
T: I was attacked. At the end of the translation K looks down.
M: In accordance with the agreement of April and May 1993, you Lt-Colonel 
were due to disarm the Muslims.
K looks at M; then shortly outside the window on his right; then back at M.
(Continued)Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  November 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 42  |  6
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Mladic ´’s persistent, direct gaze into Karremans’ eyes and the 
repeated use of the word ‘you’ is an acting out or display of anger – 
whether he feels it or not – which is expressed from a dominant posi-
tion. This is an attempt to create situational dominance. Karremans’ 
stiff body posture, body manipulators, facial expressions, as well as 
speech pauses and errors in contrast signal fear, unease, and poten-
tially feelings of helplessness (Ekman, 2001). This is true also for 
the various forms of gaze aversion such as looking to the side or 
to the ceiling (cf. Scheff and Retzinger, 1991; Ekman, 2001). At the 
same time, the video-scene shows that Karremans is able to mobilize 
some resistance. He counters one of Mladic ´’s challenges, for example, 
by stating that he had been attacked. However, Mladic ´ immediately 
raises his voice in response, trying to break the resistance. That he 
is successful can be seen in Karremans’ reaction: he ﬁ  dgets with 
his arms, holds his throat, and his forehead shows strong wrinkles; 
these cues indicate fear and discomfort (Ekman, 2001: 111–112). 
Furthermore, in response to Mladic ´’s false accusation that the Dutch 
had provided the ABiH with weapons, Karremans says ‘No’ with a 
very soft voice but allows Mladic ´ to talk over him. 
Generally, Mladic ´ used staged anger and other intimidations at 
those points during the meeting in which his situational dominance 
became potentially questioned. This was the case for example when 
Karremans referred to his superiors. Mladic ´ reacted forcefully to 
these potential threats to his situational power; in one example, he 
blusters in response, that there is little use for Karremans to talk to 
his superiors since they could not help him. These are attempts to 
bring in everything to the local situation and secure full emotional 
dominance. Ultimately, Mladic ´ succeeded: Karremans became 
entrained in a negative feedback-loop in which he focused on his 
own intimidation/fear and uncomfortableness and the strength of 
the other side; he became passive and unassertive. At no point did 
he take a strong position. Mladic ´ in contrast acted from a position 
of emotional dominance.
Karremans’ lack of EE (passivity) and fear is well illustrated by the 
following scene in which he neglects to back his superiors’ requests 
vis-à-vis Mladic ´ but instead withdraws all initiative; the metaphor of 
the piano-player, which he uses, shows that he is caught in his own 
uneasiness. Mladic ´’s reaction is a sign of emotional dominance:
Karremans (K): That’s eh what they (UN and Dutch governmental authorities) 
have asked for.
M and K: mutual gaze; K: hands folded before his abdomen; at end K moves 
left arm outward.
Translator (T):… M and K: mutual gaze; towards end K looks down.
K: eh I don’t know if I may eh expect an answer. K: slight shrug; K looks in-between M and T with gaze straight ahead; at end 
he looks at M.
T:… K looks in-between T and M.
K: Because I am realizing that ehh those ehh questions should be asked eh 
in Pale.
K moves his left hand shortly outward – slight emphasis on Pale. (He refers 
to negotiations at a higher level).
T:… K slight sway with torso.
K: Or in Sarajevo. I’ve never been there, so I don’t know how that works over 
there.
K: raised brows, slight sway of body and head. Then shakes his head as ‘No’ 
and shrug with right shoulder. K moves head between M and T. He then 
swiftly moves his arms before his abdomen in and outward; at end arms 
and palms up.
T:… K holds his belt at his back with his left hand; then re-folds his hands before 
his abdomen.
K: I’m eh what eh I used to say a piano player. Prolonged gaze to M at the end, as if waiting for a reaction; no reaction 
from M.
T:… M looks at K – K looks to ﬂ  oor.
K: Don’t shoot the piano player. K looks at M.
T:…
Mladic ´ (M): You are a lousy piano player. K looks at M; twice moves left hand outward in a rotating movement; then 
covers mouth with hand.
T:… K nods; looks shortly down; slight sway with torso.
M: instead, you armed them, you engaged in black-marketing with them 
and prepared them to ﬁ  ght against the Serbs.
K looks down, then at M; wrinkled forehead; inner corners of eyebrows raised; 
at end K looks down shortly.
T:… K looks at T. When T translates the accusation that the Dutch gave weapons 
to the ABiH K shakes his head once as a ‘No’ and says very softly ‘No’. At the 
end K takes a very deep breath and looks down.
M: on top of that, you’ve ordered your troops today to shoot at my 
soldiers.
K folds his arms before his abdomen; he holds his wrists with his hands and 
swallows strongly; repeated sway with torso.
*I am quoting the translation by the interpreter only where it deviates from Mladic ´’s or Karremans’ statements.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  November 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 42  |  7
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Karremans’ body language and statements signal intimidation/fear 
and passivity (low EE). The repeated ﬁ  dgeting with his arms including 
the rotating movement with his hand at the end indicates uneasiness, 
i.e. low EE. Similarly, the shrug (with right shoulder) and the raising 
of his arms with palms up, signal impotency and passivity (cf. Ekman, 
2001: 102–104). At the end Karremans covers his mouth with his 
hand; according to Ekman, this hiding behaviour is an indicator of 
emotional distress. Karremans succumbed to passivity and fear.
At 11.30 p.m. the same night, another meeting took place 
between Mladic ´ and Karremans, this time also with a repre-
sentative of the refugees (Nesib Mandžic ´ – NM). Here, we see a 
dramatization of self-determination and conﬁ  dence by Mladic ´. 
Mandžic ´ is made to enact the position of the victim,  representing 
those who are soon to be killed. After demanding that the ABiH 
turn over their weapons Mladic ´ adds in an overtly slow and 
calm way:
Mladic ´ (M): Have I made myself clear? 
(4.5 s) Nesib (1 s) the future of your 
people is in your hands (1.5 s) not only 
in this territory.
M leans forward and speaks slowly 
and softly.
Mladic ´’s body posture is self-conﬁ  dent. With the long pauses 
he lets the listeners experience their uneasiness; they dramatize the 
power stratiﬁ  cation. Meanwhile, Mandžic ´ shows body-manipulators 
that indicate strong fear and distress; they increase in the further 
course of the scene:
Mandžic ´ (NM): I need to tell you General (1 s) I am telling you honestly I have 
been chosen as a representative by chance. But if you’re not satisﬁ  ed with 
me that’s no problem.
NM looks to M and opens his mouth and bends forward as if to say something. 
When someone in the room stands up, NM hesitates. He diverts his gaze and 
presses his lips in an ‘embarrassed smile’. After a second hesitation, he closes 
his eyes shortly, looks away from M and then abruptly turns back. He raises 
his hands with palms up and starts speaking 13 s after M had ﬁ  nished.
Mladic ´ (M): That is your problem. Bring the people who can secure the 
surrender of weapons and save your people from destruction.
NM turns his eyes shortly away and closes them. When he turns his eyes back 
to M, a prolonged shrug occurs and a crying face can be detected when looking 
at the video-record in slow-motion. At the end of M’s remark, NM stares at 
the table.
The last scene illustrates how the interaction has taken over a 
coercive and disrespectful form. The micro-situational events have 
triggered an escalatory pathway. The meetings constituted the peak 
of an emotional dynamic in which the Serbs gradually established 
emotional dominance. They felt the passivity and fear among the 
Dutch and Bosnian Muslims. Conﬂ  icting sides are sensitive to the 
emotional state of the other side. They can feel the other side’s 
strength but also when it is falling apart; it is the latter that gives 
the momentum towards violence.
THE MASSACRE (PHASES 6 AND 7)
Onset of deportations
According to the ICTY and NIOD, a plan to deport and kill all 
men among the refugees at the UN compound in Potoc ˇari (in the 
north of the enclave) was made during the night of 11–12 July or 
in the morning of 12 July, i.e. after the meetings. They created the 
emotional shift into the atrocity.
The determination of the Bosnian Serbs can be seen when they 
moved troops, buses, and trucks into Potoc ˇari on July 12 for the 
evacuation of the enclave. When they arrived, they came face-to-face 
with UN soldiers standing guard at a cordon line, which was marked 
with red-and-white tape and shielded the refugees from the Serbs. 
Initially, Mladic ´ and other Serbian soldiers stopped at the cordon. 
In conversations with peacekeepers, Mladic ´, however, blustered that 
he is in charge and everything will be done according to his orders 
(Rohde, 1997: 203–204). The Dutch showed strong signs of fear 
and low EE: their faces are distorted and strained; some shift from 
foot to foot and avoid gaze (cf. Ekman, 2001; Collins, 2004). Shortly 
after, Serbs stepped over the cordon-tape. The peacekeepers lost 
control over the situation; soon, Serbs urged the refugees to run to 
the buses. When the Dutch tried to send jeeps with the bus-convoys 
this became a humiliating experience; their jeeps, helmets, and 
ﬂ  ack-jackets were stolen on the way at gunpoint. What is more, as 
refugees walked up to the buses, Serbian soldiers separated all men 
from women and children; Mladic ´ had given the order. The Dutch 
barely interfered. Over the course of 12 and 13 July the women and 
children were transported to Bosnian-Muslim held territory and 
the men (∼1,000) were brought to mass-collection points outside 
the enclave.
The emotionally triumphant, bullying, and humiliating 
phase of the massacre
Killings ﬁ  rst occurred in the afternoon of July 12 in Potoc ˇari, 
sometime after the arrival of Serbian troops. These killings took 
place amidst an emotional blending of celebrations and conﬁ  -
dent posturing and blustering among the Serbs, and fear and 
depressed passivity among the Dutch and refugees. The emotional 
dominance and mood of celebration among the Serbs was at its 
high point. They “swaggered and radiated conﬁ  dence, casually 
approaching the Dutch and Muslims in small groups” (Rohde, 
1997: 194). Some blustered, taunted, and cursed Muslims by 
shouting “Fuck your Turk mothers!” and “Where is Naser now?! 
[…] Look what he has done to you” (Rohde, 1997: 195) refer-
ring to the famous ABiH leader of Srebrenica. Some sang nation-
alist songs. These are Durkheimian rituals (Durkheim, 1995). 
Parading and breaking taboos by humiliating and deliberately 
scaring weak victims carry their own emotional attraction and 
generate feelings of conﬁ  dence (cf. Katz, 1988). NIOD notes, there 
“was an almost hysterical elation among the troops” (NIOD, 2002: 
Part IV, Ch. 4).
Groups of Serbian soldiers picked up men from the crowd of 
refugees and executed them in the surroundings. The fact that 
men were typically picked up or killed by groups of Serbian sol-
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Although each Serbian soldier was armed and the victims were 
not, the killings needed group emotional dominance and support 
(cf. Grossman, 2004). It shows that when violence does occur, it 
unfolds “in an interactional process that is oriented in detail to 
overcoming the confrontational tension, while continuing to leave 
traces of it” (Collins, 2008: 27).
Interactions between Dutch and Serbian soldiers in Potoc ˇari 
constituted an escalating factor. Strong signs of fear among the 
Dutch emboldened the Serbs. While they initially asked peacekeep-
ers whether they would be willing to trade ﬂ  ak jackets or pistols 
and gave up when the Dutch refused, in the afternoon, as the Dutch 
showed themselves paralyzed, they started to rob these items at 
gunpoint. The Dutch’s fear dramatized the Serbs’ emotional domi-
nance; it fed back also into the killings; there is some evidence that 
they increased. Over the course of the day and following night 
100–400 men were killed; some mutilations occurred. After the 
killings had gone on for some time, Serbs also began to rape women. 
This appears to be a general pattern of rapes in atrocities. Collins 
(2008) notes that rapes typically occur only after killings have been 
going on for some time.
The killings and abuses in Potoc ˇari were not ordered but likely 
encouraged by Serbian commanders (NIOD, 2002). Some had 
been in attendance or nearby the earlier meetings, which embold-
ened them and led to a mood of excitement. Emotional dynamics 
now fed onto each other. As the peacekeepers in Potoc ˇari proved 
emotionally incapable of interfering with the deportations and 
killings and showed heavy signs of fear, this had a strong effect 
on the regular troops. It established full emotional dominance 
and led to a “moral holiday” (Collins, 2008), i.e. a free zone with-
out social controls6. Nevertheless, in the rare cases in which a 
peacekeeper complained when Serbs were picking up Muslim 
men, they gave in. This shows how the massacre depended on 
full emotional dominance.
In summary, the crucial aspects of these ﬁ  rst killings were the 
situational, emotional dynamics that worked into it. Different 
dynamics enmeshed here:
(1)  the build-up of conﬁ  dence among the Serbs over the course 
of the attack,
(2)  the emotional impetus from the meetings,
(3) in  Potoc ˇari, the stark emotional contrast between the Serbs 
and fearful Muslims and Dutch triggered a feedback loop in 
which Serbian soldiers became more and more emboldened, 
determined, and violent.
Beyond the Srebrenica massacre itself, I want to highlight ﬁ  rst 
theoretical conclusions: (a) Massacres occur by attacking a paralyzed 
victim. Local, emotional dominance paves the way into  atrocity; it 
is produced in micro-interactions. (b) Micro- interactions and their 
emotional outcomes determine where and when atrocities do or 
do not come off; they create the short-run shifts in emotions that 
establish the situational turning point into violence. (c) Situational 
emotional dynamics are crucial to understand what an atrocity 
looks like on the micro-level: Triumphant, carousing killings, which 
are often found at the onset of massacres (e.g. Chang, 1997), are 
triggered by the emotional shift into the atrocity. The swift rise in 
emotional dominance after a period of tension unleashes ebullience 
and violence. Here, the emotional contrast between a dominant 
side and a weak, paralyzed victim reinforces itself in a negative 
feedback loop.
Towards mass-executions
After about 12–16 h (i.e. early on July 13), the triumphant, bully-
ing killings declined. As the evacuation resumed in the morning 
of July 13, less and less refugees were left in Potoc ˇari. This led to 
an atmosphere permeated by organizational procedures, which 
broke off the rituals of killing and wore down the celebratory 
mood. Video recordings of Serbian soldiers patrolling at the buses 
show mostly neutral faces. More generally this suggests that as 
soon as organizational procedures take precedence in atrocities, 
the carousing atmosphere wears off. Here we see that the internal 
pattern of violence in atrocities is a situated process.
The killing of the remaining Bosnian Muslim men (including 
several thousand men who were captured while trying to ﬂ  ee the 
enclave) turned into methodical mass executions: victims were typi-
cally shot from behind (often they were also blindfolded or had 
to lie with faces down). The avoidance of face-to-face confronta-
tion reduces the emotional stress of killing (Grossman, 2004). It 
appears that the emotional rush is gone. Some Serbs were repulsed 
and arguments broke out about who would ﬁ  nish up wounded 
victims. Also, many Muslim men who were captured by Serbian 
soldiers after July 19, i.e. after the end of mass-executions, were not 
killed but brought to prisoner of war camps. These ﬁ  ndings illus-
trate again that the key for the massacre to occur was the build-up 
phase and the emotional shift at the turning point into the atroc-
ity. Crucially, this ﬁ  rst dynamic lost its power over time. We see 
an emotional dynamic ﬂ  owing in time: a build-up, turning point, 
peak, and falling off.
The ﬁ  ndings on the internal structure of the massacre illus-
trate some of the points raised at the beginning: (a) Not only the 
occurrence but also the form of atrocities is a situated process; 
(b) Violence is difﬁ  cult and even where it occurs, its dynamics and 
forms are still structured by a ﬁ  eld of confrontational tension/fear. 
(c) In sum, confrontational tension/fear and situational micro-
dynamics (emotional and interactional) are crucial to explain the 
internal patterns of violence in atrocities: (i) Carousing killings 
that can typically be found at the onset of massacres are unleashed 
by the emotional shift at the turning point into the atrocity; the 
swift rise in situational dominance triggers violence and exuber-
ance (incl. rituals of humiliation and taunting). (ii) The concept 
of confrontational tension helps explain why killings in massacres 
are often committed in groups, even against a single, unarmed 
victim: since the main physiological characteristic of violence 
is confrontational tension, it needs an atmosphere of complete 
emotional dominance – group solidarity is a key  ingredient here. 
6The killings in Potoc ˇari were not as emotionally wild as other atrocities such as 
the Nanking massacre (Chang, 1997). In some cases Serbs were looking for speciﬁ  c 
people or were asking for people from villages that had been the target of Mu-
slim raids during the two-year standoff. Atrocities in fact show variation along a 
continuum from more calculating and selective targeting towards heavy emotional 
carousing such as in the Nanking massacre with widespread and prolonged cele-
bratory destruction, torture, killing games, and orgiastic rapes. However, even in 
atrocities in which speciﬁ  c targeting is involved, it is the overall atmosphere, i.e. the 
emotional dominance that makes the violence happen. In other words, emotional 
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(iii) Shouting humiliating remarks during atrocities creates self-
entrainment and boosts EE and dominance (Katz, 1988); it helps 
overcoming confrontational tension/fear. Standard explanations 
of atrocities do not capture this situated process. (iv) Emotional, 
situational dynamics explain shifts in the form of killings dur-
ing an atrocity; in our case, the shift away from triumphant and 
ebullient killings (including the usage of tools to reduce con-
frontational tension such as blindfolds) occurred as organiza-
tional procedures took precedence and the initial atmosphere 
wore down.
Beyond the aspects that can be addressed here, the empirical 
phenomenon of internal dynamics of atrocities opens up an array 
of additional questions that need to be addressed in future research; 
for example: Why do atrocities extend over varying periods of time? 
What explains how quick the initial atmosphere at the turning point 
into the atrocity peters out?
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
The empirical analysis presented has three main theoretical impli-
cations: (1) Atrocities have a pattern of situational emergence. 
Emotional dynamics are crucial to explain where and when and 
in what manner atrocities unfold. (2) Micro-interactions and their 
emotional outcomes constitute situational turning points towards, 
or away from atrocities. The key micro-situational trigger towards 
atrocity is the swift disintegration of an opponent. Here, small 
moves one way or another can have large-scale consequences. In 
the Srebrenica case we saw an emotional build-up phase and a 
situational trigger when the peacekeeping commander showed 
himself paralyzed in the face of implicit threats, and the defeated 
Muslims themselves turned passive. It was at this moment that the 
local commander gave the order for the massacre. (3) Emotional 
dynamics are crucial to explain the internal (time)-dynamics of 
atrocities. For the Srebrenica massacre this paper identiﬁ  ed an 
emotional ﬂ  ow over time with a triumphant, humiliating phase 
of killings at the beginning, a wearing down of the initial atmos-
phere after several hours, a shift towards mass executions (includ-
ing measures to reduce the emotional stress of killings such as 
blindfolding), and an end of the massacre after several days. These 
ﬁ  ndings show that forms and time-dynamics of killings during 
massacres are structured by a ﬁ  eld of confrontational tension. 
Background factors are insufﬁ  cient tools to explain what  atrocities 
look like.
APPENDIX
Appendix II | Emotional Cues.
High–Low 
Emotional 
Energy (EE)
High EE/Conﬁ  dence in interactions with 
contending side:
Voice: loud, ﬁ  rm voice – in power-position: talking over 
other person; interruptions; challenges/dares; blaming; 
criticism; threats; ultimatums.
Body Language and Facial Expressions: moving ﬁ  rmly; 
taking initiative in interactions; strong physical presence 
by making oneself large: standing erect and/or hands on 
hips – in strong power position: cf. anger.
Low EE/Conﬁ  dence in interactions with 
contending side:
Voice: oversoft speech; irregular rhythm; fragmented 
speech; frequent and long pauses; stammering; ﬁ  ll 
words; defensiveness; repetition; self-interruption; 
vagueness, unﬁ  nished thoughts (all indicate disorganized 
thought processes typical of states of low conﬁ  dence).
Body Language, Face: stiff stance; leaning away from 
other person; avoiding gaze (head down or turned to 
side, lowering and closing eyes); blushing; struggle for 
control such as biting the tongue, false smiling, turning 
the lips in, biting or licking them; hand touches or covers 
face, eyes, mouth; hands touching hair, neck; scratching; 
passivity; postures and movements that are shrinking, 
hesitating/vacillating, disjointed, withdrawing; fumbling 
(ﬁ  ngering of the clothing; twisting of the ﬁ  ngers); 
sweating; blanching; tremor of hand.
Group 
Solidarity
High group solidarity: ﬁ  ne-tuned, smooth ﬂ  ow of 
verbal and nonverbal behaviour; moving towards one 
other; hugging/body contact; mutual eye contact – 
Scheff (Scheff and Retzinger, 1991) refers to this as 
attunement.
Low group solidarity: low attunement – cf. also 
indicators of low conﬁ  dence/EE.
Anger Overlap with acting conﬁ  dently (and from a strong 
power-position); can be distinguished based on context 
information.
Voice: talking over other person; interruptions; 
challenges/dares; blaming; criticism; threats; 
ultimatums.
Body Language, Face: Brows lowered and drawn 
together; tensed upper and lower lid; direct hard gaze; 
lips ﬁ  rmly pressed together or open & tensed in 
squarish shape; clenched ﬁ  sts; moving ﬁ  rmly.
Fear There are strong overlaps with the low end on the EE 
continuum.
Voice: cf. low conﬁ  dence, esp. oversoft speech; irregular 
rhythm; fragmented speech; stammering; ﬁ  ll words; 
suppressed references; unﬁ  nished thoughts.
Body Language, Face: brows raised and drawn together; 
wrinkles in centre of forehead; raise upper eyelid; raised 
and tense lower eyelid; open mouth; drawn back tensed 
or stretched lips; struggle for control; hand touches or 
covers face, eyes, mouth; postures and movements that 
are shrinking; manipulators.
Appendix I | Transcribing Conventions.
1. Pauses
Nesib (1 s) the future of your people Numerals in parentheses indicate 
the length of a pause in seconds.
2. Stress
Let’s go boys move! Bold prints indicate stress in 
volume and voice pitch.
3. Transcriber’s comments
K’s gaze is directed downward. His 
hands are folded before his 
abdomen.
Italics contain the transcriber’s 
comments on body language, facial 
expressions, and vocal manners.
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Sadness Body Language, Face: Inner corners of eyebrows are 
drawn up; upper eyelid corner is raised; corners of the 
lips are down or the lip is trembling; shrinking body 
posture; struggle for control; hand touches or covers 
face or eyes. For sadness that corners on depression cf. 
clues for low EE. Sadness can be distinguished from 
fear based on context information and body movements.
Surprise Face: Raised brows (curved and high); skin below the 
brow is stretched; horizontal wrinkles across the 
forehead; eyelids opened (no tenseness); jaw drops 
open so that lips and teeth are parted but no tension or 
stretching of mouth as in fear. To differentiate surprise
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from fear I rely on context information and body 
movements: fear tends to go hand in hand with 
shrinking body postures, manipulators, struggle for 
control (biting tongue, false smiling).
Joy/Happiness Overlaps with cues for high group solidarity: moving 
closer towards each other, group laughter, body contact, 
mutual eye contact (no gaze aversion).